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ABSTRACT
Organizations fall victim to costly attacks every year. This has created a
need for more successful layers of defense. To aid in this need for additional
defense, this study researches a way to bolster an underused defense style
called deceptive defense. Researchers agree that deceptive defense could be
the future of cybersecurity, and they call for more research in the deceptive
category. The unresolved question from these researchers is what attack style
could be used with a deception-based defense on an attacker. From this
unresolved question, it was also determined that social engineering should be
used in this culminating experience project as the attack style in question. This
led to the question: “How can cyber defensive deception borrow concepts from
social engineering to aid in bolstering a deception-based defense?” This project
focused on researching concepts from both deceptive defense and social
engineering, and to apply concepts from a popular attack style to a less popular
defense style. This was done through a path of research into techniques,
influence concepts, and two popular frameworks. It takes a 4-phased approach:
researching deceptive defense techniques, researching social engineering
concepts, researching two popular frameworks, and then applying one to the
other. The findings are that: (1) there are similar concepts from both attack and
defense styles; (2) there are techniques with similar applications but applied to
the opposite parties (attackers or defenders); (3) and that it was possible to pull
concepts from the social engineering framework to plan a deception-based
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defense. Further research would be desirable in an applied approach of how an
attacker reacts to each persuasion principle. More research would also be
recommended in the honeypot technique as an alerting and profiling technique.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Background
“Oh, what a tangled web we weave...when first we practice to deceive.”
- Sir Walter Scott, Marmion (1891)
From the research of Zhang et al. (2021), deception is defined as the act
of manipulating the perception of someone by exploiting psychological
vulnerabilities through guile or deceit. The goal of deception is to fraudulently
alter beliefs, decisions, or actions (Zhang et al., 2021). This study focuses on
both defensive deception and offensive deception in the field of cybersecurity.
Defensive deception comes in the form of a category of deception practices used
by the defense, and offensive deception comes in the form of social engineering.
A socially engineered attack does not require being in the digital realm, but for
the purposes of this study, it will be referred to as a digital deception attack.
Deception has been used in a wide spectrum of settings throughout the years,
both offensively and defensively, in nature, battle tactics, behavioral studies, and
as already mentioned, in cyber defense. To begin with, deception had its origin in
nature.
Nature has multiple examples of deception, but two types of deception
stand out that both have direct examples of being used offensively and
defensively: mimicry and feigning death (Humphreys et al., 2018). These two
types of deception influence the attacker or victim into believing a falsehood. We
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can see mimetic deception from species such as the Mimic Octopus
(Thaumoctopous Mimicus), which can defend itself by mimicking other animals.
Mimicking deceives its predator or its prey depending on the situation (Hanlon et
al., 2007). This type of deception is both offensive and defensive, based on how
the octopus reacts to the threat. Alternatively, another deception in nature that
can be both offensive and defensive is the strategy of feigning death (Humphreys
et al., 2018). Playing dead is practiced by animals such as insects, lizards,
rodents, and birds. Lizards use feigning death as a defensive deception, causing
predators that consume only freshly killed prey to avoid them (Humphreys et al.,
2018). Spiders can use deception offensively, luring in their prey with a variety of
traps built into their webs (Almeshekah, 2014). Understanding offensive and
defensive deception at these base levels helps this study see that deception is
not restricted to its current uses within a cyber defense. It has been around
longer than cyber defense and inspiration has already been drawn from the
natural world. Mimicry can be seen in current cyber deceptive defenses such as
honeypots (Ferguson et al., 2018), and feigning death is present in stalling tactics
involved in attacker engagement (Horak et al., 2017). These are but a few
examples of deception that are visible throughout nature, and it was further
emulated with the war tactics of societies.
Ancient military strategies pioneered deception in war through tactics such
as the fabled “Trojan Horse” circa 1184. This type of offensive deception would
have allowed an attacker to break through a defense while preserving resources
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and tricking the opposing defenders into letting their guards down (Sembos,
2021). Examples of both offensive and defensive deception are commonplace in
war. Ever since men have been at war with other men, ruses, feints, and
deceptive techniques have been used (Calder, 2016). In ancient China, 341 BC,
researchers discovered deceptive techniques being used by general Sun Bin and
his army. Sun Bin faced an enemy attack that underestimated his army’s morale.
Sun Bin used this underestimation to his advantage, luring in the enemy with a
ruse that looked like his own army was deserting (Wasson, 2022). This defensive
deception tactic played on the perceptions of his enemy to guide the adversary
into defeat. These uses of deception were done creatively in a goal-oriented
manner. This study is focused on the use of deception in an attack and defense
scenario, and these examples of deception are pulled from militaristic tactics.
Seeing deception used creatively allows for this study to understand that
deception formulated by humans for a human’s perception can be extremely
effective. The study of deception and perceptions was broadened and delved into
through behavioral studies in more current times.
Behavioral deceptions, and the motivations behind them, were presented
in three taxonomies by Burgoon et al. (1996). These taxonomies describe the
use of deception in interpersonal contexts. Interpersonal behavioral deception is
a style of communication that can be used to make an individual look better
within social contexts or influence another’s behaviors (Calder, 2016). This
behavioral deception is the foundation of social engineering, where people that
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want something from another person could use a form of social engineering.
Forms of human manipulation to gain a resource can be considered a form of
social engineering (CompTIA, 2022). It is an attack that has evolved with the
times, but a modern conception of social engineering is a calculated set of
human manipulations that methodically reaches the end target (Mitnick, 2022).
Social engineering is a threat to privacy that is a form of psychological
manipulation. This psychological manipulation is used to exploit people to gain a
foothold in a network, glean information that has some sort of value, or used to
reveal confidential information (Aldawood, 2020). At its core, social engineering
takes advantage of human behavior to gain an advantage against its target. This
form of attack relies on deception, and people are notoriously bad at detecting
deceptions (Aldawood, 2020). For example, the ability of an untrained observer
to detect lies was estimated to be 53% in a research study performed by Vrij et
al. (2010). This study poised untrained observers against trained observers to
detect lies after watching a person tell either a lie or a truth. The trained
observers’ success rate was estimated to be 57%, slightly higher than an
untrained observer.
The behavioral studies of deception, and gaps in current security
methods, led to studies of deception within cyber defense. Cyber defensive
deception is rapidly evolving and becoming a part of an organization’s defense
strategy (Zhang et al., 2021). Cyber defensive deception is the act of defense
that uses digital deceptive means to mitigate attacks. Deception used in the
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digital universe was first theorized forty years ago in a novel written by Cliff Stoll
titled The Cuckoo’s Egg. This novel uses the example of a “honeypot” to attempt
to catch a hacker (Stoll, 1995). A honeypot is one of the earliest forms of useful
digital deception, where a resource is made appealing enough for an attacker to
engage with it and become stopped/delayed/tracked by falling into the trap
(Almeshekah, 2014). The idea of a honeypot has developed over the years into
different variants such as honeynets and honeytokens. This type of deception is
an ad-hoc style of deceptive defense and has also been gaining popularity in
recent years. We are seeing holistic forms of digital deception that utilize multiple
forms of deception to mesh into a layered defense that can mitigate an attacker
at levels as high as an advanced persistent threat (Zhu et al., 2021). Between
social engineering and deceptive defense, it is apparent that deception can be
actively used in both attacking and defending an organization (Levine, 2014).

The Problem
Pawlick et al. (2019) states that defensive deception is an emerging and
underused defensive layer that utilizes human behavior and trickery to attempt to
defend a targeted cyber resource. The same researcher predicts that the future
of cybersecurity “will leverage tools commonly employed by attackers for the
purpose of defense.” They state that future research is needed within the
problem area of how leveraging an attacker’s tools can aid the defense. Current
research believes that deception, or specific defensive deception techniques, has
more opportunity than discovered so far within cyberspace (Pawlick et al., 2019).
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Further, an unambiguous attack environment has created a need to further the
use of defensive deception through ambiguity and influence type tactics (Calder,
2016), which brings relevance to this project. Research from Almeshkah (2014)
states that “deception can play a larger and more important role in cyber
defense.” In the research of NITRD (2010, Networking and Information
Technology Research and Development), recommendations for researching how
to complicate and make an unpredictable attack surface through frustrating an
attacker were presented. Based on the discovery of requested research by
Pawlick et al. (2019), Almeshkah (2014), Calder (2016), and NITRD (2010), a
question was partially formed regarding concepts within an attack style that could
bolster a deception-based defense. To fully formulate this question, an attack
style needed to be chosen to focus this research on. In game-theory research
focused on deception-based defenses, the defenders were treated like social
engineers, with a potential of altering an attacker’s moves. Social engineering is
stated to be a form of deception that is comparable to a deceptive defense from
the research of Ferguson-Walter et al (2019). According to a survey conducted
by ISACA (Information Systems Audit and Control Association) in 2020, social
engineering was the leading cause of compromised businesses at 14%. It was
40% more likely to be the reason of compromise than the next leading cause,
advanced persistent threats. Social engineering is a prominent and successful
attack type within a wide diversity of organizations (VPN et al., 2021). Social

6

engineering attacks seek to use the act of human error, confusion, and trickery to
perform various levels of successful malicious activity (Mitnick, 2022).
When justifying social engineering as the attack type to research with the
intent of applying its concepts to a deceptive defense, we looked at the top attack
types. In the ISACA (2020) report, the top six attacks that were reported on were
social engineering (14%), advanced persistent threats, ransomware, unpatched
systems, security misconfigurations, and Denial of Service attacks. Of these six,
it is prudent to further narrow down to the top three for consideration as they are
seen as more successful attacks according to this survey. In a study by
Gallegos-Segovia et al. (2017), it was seen that social engineering can be used,
and is used, as an attack vector for ransomware. Users in this study were sent
fraudulent socially engineered emails and 85% of the users installed malicious
ransomware on their computers. To further justify social engineering as the
attack type to pull concepts from for a deceptive defense, APTs (advanced
persistent threats) are successful due to social engineering (Bere et al., 2015).
This same research shows that various forms of social engineering are used by
over 50% of APTs to enter a network. It also suggests that an APT should be
dealt with through behavioral methods, which is relevant to the advised research
of the deceptive defense papers mentioned prior.

Questions
The question that emerged based on the areas of the previously
mentioned research and the question that this project focuses on is: “How can
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cyber defensive deception borrow concepts from social engineering to aid in
bolstering a deception-based defense?” This question led to the following
question that this project addresses as well: “What influence concepts in cyber
defensive deception match influence concepts in social engineering?”

Methodology
A route of research was determined to answer the question: “How can
cyber defensive deception borrow concepts from social engineering to aid in
bolstering a deception-based defense?” The route of research for understanding
how digital deception could utilize more concepts from social engineering was
taken through scholarly articles, research articles, propositions, reports, thesis,
best practices, and conferences. These items of research were used to form an
idea of four major principles. First, to understand what cyber defensive deception
is and what techniques are currently being used by defenders. Second, an
understanding of social engineering was formed through principles of persuasion
and examples of social engineering within those principles. Third, frameworks of
both defensive deception and social engineering were researched. And finally,
the meshing of the techniques was explored. The final principle explores the
ability for defensive deception to borrow concepts from social engineering, the
difficulties that stem from this, and the advantages/disadvantages of how this
could be done. This project will be based on research analysis using Google
Scholar and sources pulled from scholarly journal websites, cyber security
articles and cited sources within articles. The search was within the confines of
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2010 or later for the major scholarly articles. Resources found within publications
led to a large portion of the relevant research per category. Defensive deception
scholarly articles led to more scholarly articles, allowing for a chain of relevant
articles to explore the topic.
The second phase focused on understanding social engineering and
principles of persuasion, which was used to help answer the secondary question:
“What influence concepts in cyber defensive deception match influence concepts
in social engineering?” These social engineering principles were researched
through the perspective of the manipulation of human behaviors, and as such led
to studies relevant to how an attacker alters the victims’ behaviors to successfully
compromise the desired information. The path of research described here can be
found in Table 1.

Table 1. Path of Research
Search Method

Category

Results

Selected

Key Words

Google Scholar

Deception Based
Defenses

95

7

“deceptive
defense”

Question 1
Authors: Ferguson-Walter (2020), Ferguson-Walter et al. (2018), Calder
(2016), Al-Shaer (2015), Horak et al. (2017), Schuh (2021), Zhu et al. (2021)

9

Selection and Keyword Choices: The “deceptive defense” keyword search
was used to allow for selecting documents within a broad perspective of this
research category. The 7 selected documents in the category of “deceptive
defense” were selected based on forming a well-rounded current
understanding of deceptive defense. They add up to the reasoning of why and
how researchers believe deceptive defense is useful and in which scenarios it
is currently being used. The actual selection was directed at those concepts
presented by the researchers.
Google Scholar

Deception Based
Defenses

60

6

Question 1

“defensive
cyber
deception”

Authors: Almeshkah (2014), Levin (2014), Pawlick et al. (2019), Pouget et al.
(2003), NITRD (2010), Zhang et al. (2021)
Selection and Keyword Choices: The “defensive cyber deception” keyword
search was selected to create a focus on the use of deceptive defense within
a cyber environment. There was some overlap between these two searches,
but it allowed for research that included more cyber based deception
reasoning, examples, and definitions.
Google Scholar

Influence & Social 38
Engineering

Question 1 & 2

10

5

“social
engineering
influence”

Authors: Mitnick (2022), Mouton et al. (2014), Hebert et al. (2021), VPN et al.
(2021)
Selection and Keyword Choices: The “social engineering influence” keyword
search was desirable for this project since the predicted connection between
defensive and offensive deception is the influence exerted on an individual’s
behavior. The focus from the research of social engineering was then directed
at influence which branched into the techniques used by the attackers. The
relevant articles were selected based on the relevance to concepts of social
engineering and how the concepts were described.
Google Scholar

Influence & Social 80
Engineering

4

Question 2

“social
engineering
taxonomy”

Authors: Mouton et al. (2014), Bere et al. (2015), Aldawood et al. (2020), Vrij
et al. (2010)
Selection and Keyword Choices: To research further into social engineering, it
was useful for this study to explore social engineering taxonomies. A
taxonomy was chosen from the above keywords. This research area also
helped the paper find social engineering examples within various techniques.
Expert
Recommendation

Influence & Social N/A
Engineering

3

Authors: Muscanell (2014), Ferreira et al. (2015), Cialdini (2007)
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“influence
types”

Selection and Keyword Choices: Relying on the input of the researchers within
the field of influence led to research articles and a book written by Dr. Cialdini
referenced in those articles. The book was cited and referenced in a multitude
of other studies that led it to being included in this research project as a guide
for influence types and principles.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW

The research for this project focused within two primary areas: digital
defensive deception and social engineering tactics. Creating this focus in these
given areas was done by selecting literature found using the key phrases:
“deception defense” and “defensive cyber deception”. A second search was then
done for “social engineering influence.” Each article within the search results was
selected based on its relevance to the problem being addressed for this project.
There is a large amount of research done in both categories, and abstracts were
read for relevancy. The relevant articles were selected based on their research
into the principles of digital deception or social engineering and their ability to
expand on the principles of either subject. A holistic understanding of both
principles needed to be established to apply one concept to the other.
A taxonomy of defensive deception for cybersecurity was conducted by
Pawlick et al. (2019). This taxonomy covered the various types of deception
while attempting to quantify the results with game theoretic mathematics. The
researchers aimed to define these types of deception using game theory to refine
the definition of deception outside of the previously broad use of the term. They
applied relevant models to many deceptive techniques in cyber security to
construct a taxonomy of the concepts: perturbation, moving target defense,
obfuscation, mixing, honey-x, and attacker engagement. This research is
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relevant to the project because they define the separation of deceptive
techniques. This separation will allow the focus to be on a specific defensive
deception technique as needed.
Zhang et al. (2021) compiled three decades of cyber defense deception
techniques with the design of giving cyber defenders a tool to develop a
deception-based defense. These researchers state that they are the first to
compile such a representative, systematic guide for deception techniques. The
guide will allow for a certain defense to be applied to a certain type of attack. The
research introduces and expands on the idea of a “deception stack,” “deception
in depth,” and “deception lifecycle.” This paper is directly related to applying a
deception technique to a specific problem and how to evaluate the success of
that approach. It is going to be used as a tool, as the researchers intended,
exploring the addition of an influence concept to a deceptive defense technique.
This process will potentially aid in the mitigation of an attack.
In 2018, Ferguson-Walter et al. published the Tularosa Study. The
Tularosa Study was undertaken by testing 130+ red team hackers. The study
tracked personalities, psychological intent, and cognitive tests of these
participants while they navigated through an attack on a network. The attackers
were told that there were either deception practices at play or that there were not
deception practices at play. The sample network was studied with and without
the deception technique. The study was done utilizing decoys within the network
as the primary form of deception. Ferguson-Walter et al. (2018) went on to
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publish theses, summaries, and scholarly articles related to their findings in this
study. This research project found useful information in much of the research
surrounding this case study since it is current research into the effectiveness of
deception as a defense. The research done by Ferguson-Walter et al. is vital to
the research done moving forward as they proved multiple facets of how
attackers can be influenced in an environment laced with decoys.
The MITRE Corporation (2015) released an article titled “Denial and
Deception in Cyber Defense.” This article laid the groundwork for an
organization’s “active” cyber defense with the “deception chain.” The deception
chain is an adaptation of the kill chain model utilized in cybersecurity (Heckman,
2015). The kill chain model follows the stages of a cyber-attack, and the
deception chain is meant to help integrate denial/deception, cyber intelligence,
and security operations into an organization. They lay out the deception chain in
eight phases: purpose, collect intelligence, design cover story, plan, prepare,
execute, monitor, and reinforce. This specific article and the research put forth by
The MITRE Corporation will be vital to the exploration of implementing a
defensive deception technique in the confines of this research project. An
offshoot of this article is “Military Cyber Affairs” by Calder (2016), which makes a
case for deceptive defense. They treat the deception techniques in a more
utilitarian style, with the idea that the techniques can be framed from a military
style of deception. It is a grounded approach that makes an argument for
deception in the form of “increasing adversarial costs” outweighing the cost of
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defense. The research provided by Calder (2016) frames deception tactics as an
attack on attackers. The author’s discussion of the deceptive style of defense is
relevant to this research project as they include concepts from MITRE’s eightstep deception process that will also be referenced in this paper.
In a research paper written by Almeshekah (2014), a plan for
implementing deception into current security defenses was presented. The
research paper takes current systems and goes through how deception could be
integrated, similarly to The MITRE Corporation, but with more emphasis on the
practical application of applying deception techniques into an existing set of
systems. The researchers analyzed the components that make up any type of
deception presented through prior studies and then applied it to a computer’s
security. This paper also presents how to set up a deception defense in
environments that lead to success and then how to evaluate the success. An
attacker’s biases will also be extracted from this research paper to aid in
understanding why an attacker may fall for the deception.
Up to this point of research, the focus has been on deceptive defenses
within a defense plan. After building up the toolbox of methodologies, tactics, and
support for cyber defensive deception, the research led into the details of social
engineering. This project will use the work from Muscanell (2014) called
“Weapons of Influence Misused” to understand how social engineering is
successful. The research done by Muscanell applies social influence tactics to
the scams used by social engineers. Muscanell (2014) gives examples of social
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influence attacks in the context of internet scams used to gain information. For
these purposes, he uses concepts from an expert psychologist: Cialdini. Cialdini
(2007) published a book titled “Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion.” This
book goes through the principles of influence, laid out in six concepts: reciprocity,
commitment/consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity. These
concepts will also be used within this project to be applied to current defensive
deception techniques. Cialdini’s principles of influence are a cornerstone of
studies that researchers have focused on social engineering, being the source of
many other studies as well. This project will explain the principles, including
examples from social engineering using the principles, and show constructive
ideas of how they may be used within a deception-based defense.
One last piece of the puzzle this project will be relying on is the structure
put in place by Mouton et al. (2014) regarding a social engineering attack. These
researchers broke down Kevin Mitnick’s stages of a social engineer attack and
expanded on the content within each stage. After Mouton et al. created an attack
framework, there was a structured way to not only evaluate and map a social
engineering attack but to also create one. The framework they created allows us
to utilize it within the deceptive defense to see how it may be paired with the
planning and execution of a deceptive defense.
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CHAPTER THREE:
DECEPTION TECHNIQUES AND INFLUENCE

A defensive deception technique (DDT) attempts to influence an attacker’s
perception of their target. An effective DDT either hides, confuses, or misleads
an attacker causing them to waste resources (time, energy, or processing power)
and attack in a complicated or wrong direction. This causes an attacker to be
delayed, exposed, or disoriented (Zhang et al., 2021). This type of defense relies
on manipulating human behavior and attempting to apply deceptive behavioral
illusions on the attacker. Defenders can understand an adversary’s attack, apply
deception techniques, force attackers to move slow, take greater risks, and use
more resources allowing the defender an advantage in preventing an attack
(Heckman et al., 2015). A defense that seeks to mitigate reconnaissance efforts
is considered passive, while interactively engaging with an attacker is considered
active (Horak et al., 2017). The categories of DDTs that this project will limit itself
to are honey technologies, moving target defenses, and attacker engagements.
The limitation to these three techniques is due to the wide range of interaction
possibilities within each category. This chapter will be covering the categories
and the amount of interactivity per category, followed by an analysis of the
influences at the interactivity levels.
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Honey Technologies
The term “honey technology” is an umbrella term covering a DDT that
attracts an attacker to a resource set up by a defender that mimics an actual
resource. It then tracks, traps, or slows down an attacker. If a honey technology
is being interreacted with, it is an anomaly and should not be happening unless a
malicious actor is the cause (Spitzner, 2003). Honey technologies can be seen in
three major categories: honeypots, honeynets, and honeytokens (Pouget et al.,
2003).
A honeypot is a system that is designed to attract an attacker to use
exploits against it (Calder, 2016). When implementing a honeypot, the indicators
that there is a honeypot should be concealed in most cases (Heckman et al.,
2015). Defined by a public forum of security professionals in 2003, a honeypot is
“an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of
that resource” (Spitzner, 2003). Honeypots evolved into other technologies such
as honeytokens and honeynets. Each of these ideas work off the same principle
as a honeypot: something that is appealing to an attacker to either be targeted,
attacked, or interacted with (Pouget et al., 2003). A honeypot ranges from low
interaction where the resource is there to be probed, or high interaction such as a
fully mimicked system that an attacker could interact with. In a 2017 survey of
organizations, it was hypothesized that honeypots would be the most popular
form of honey technology, but the results show that the most widely used honey
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technology was honeytokens because they are more widely available and more
easily deployed (Dominguez, 2021).
A honeytoken is defined as “a digital or information system resource
whose value lies in the unauthorized use of that resource” (Spitzner, 2003). An
example presented by the researcher Pouget et al. (2003) is a medical record
stored in a database called “John F. Kennedy.” This would be a false record that
if interacted with would be highly suspicious. Security has been using the idea of
honeytokens for as long as security has been around, but honeytokens in the
widely used context refer to a wide collection of deception techniques based on
being bait resources (Zhang, 2021). The attacker “picks up” the honeytoken and
“uses it.” The “pick-up” or the “use” triggers the defense mechanism, such as an
alarm that it was “used.” Just like honeypots, honeytokens can also range from
low interaction to high interaction. In the presented example of the medical
record, just accessing the record may be all the defender wants to track and is
the extent of the honeytoken. If the medical record also has further information in
it that further influences the attacker, the interaction level with the honeytoken
goes up.
A honeynet is a network of honeypots, mimicking a real network to be
explored by an attacker. The act of exploring this honeynet leads to a higher level
of interaction (Pouget et al., 2003). The interaction level with each style of honey
technology ranges from low to high, depending on the goal of the defense. In the
research done by Pouget (2003, p. 9), he offers the definition by Won-Seok Lee
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where honeynets are “…nothing more than a high involvement honeypot within
which risks, and vulnerabilities are the same that exists in many organizations
today.” A defender can see how the attacker moves from honeypot to honeypot,
through the network, attempting to exploit the various systems and set ups. A
honeynet can be seen as a high interaction honey technology, as it is more
complex with more desire placed on an attacker moving through the
environment. This leads to reasoning that having a honeynet can be used to
watch and or engage with the attacker interacting with it, much like a spider’s
web is there to specifically attract and/or trap an insect. While the honeynet may
be useful for research and engagement purposes, Zhu et al. (2021) describes a
highly usable version of a honeypot he termed “minefield honeypots”. The
minefield honeypot can be used to begin the offensive deception from the
deceptive defense by disrupting the reconnaissance and delivery of the attack. In
addition, a minefield honeypot can be used to either act as an alarm for the
defense or to provide more chances of studying the attacker. By studying the
attacker, a deceptive defense can better understand how to treat the upcoming
attack (Zhu et al. 2021).

Moving Target Defense
Moving Target Defense (MTD) is defined by the Networking and
Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) website as a
defense technique for “cyber agility.” The defense works “by randomizing or
mutating the system configuration to invalidate the attackers’ goal” (Al-Shaer et
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al., 2015). While the research presented by NITRD categorizes MTD as an agile
defense strategy, it fits the definition of a deceptive defense by “disrupting
attacker plans via changing adversarial behaviors” through means the attacker is
not expecting. MTD is meant to be a proactive defense strategy that can alter
defense strategies and move system parameters during or prior to an imminent
attack. MTDs increase the cost for attackers by creating a more fluid and
complex defending platform…taking more time, energy, and expertise to
navigate the attack landscape (NITRD, 2010). While a moving target itself is a
deceptive defense, a deception on top of the movement of the target increases
the effectiveness (Cohen, 2009). The way a target can be moved is broken into
two categories: randomization and Markov decision processes, where the
Markov decision process has an outcome with some control and some noncontrol (Pawlick et al., 2019).

Attacker Engagement
The attacker engagement technique of deceptive defense is a higher level
of interaction between both the attacker and the defender. It is squarely in the
“active” consideration for deceptive defenses because an attacker is trading
moves with the defender (Horak et al., 2017). The defender has more control of
when and where to employ a deception once an attacker is identified. When
looking at this defense from the perspective of a game where moves are being
traded, the defender can employ different deceptive strategies depending on
their goal. In this “game” of defense, it is found that when engaging and blocking
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the attacker, it is best to be delayed from the initial attack (Horak et al., 2017).
The idea is that an attacker that is deceptively led further into an attack can be
learned from and give up on their own accord, rather than being blocked right
away and then re-entering to cause an extensive amount of damage.

Influence Chance and Deception Chain
As mentioned before, a defender could have different goals for
implementing a defensive deception. The goal of a defender alters the course of
the influence that the defender will be attempting to place on the attacker (Horak
et al., 2017). If the defender’s goal is to learn about what the attacker is doing
within a honeynet, the defender may want to try and keep the attacker busy and
waste as much time as possible. With this issue for evaluating influences and the
goals of a defender, influences can be broken into interaction amounts. A
defender can pick techniques with ranges from low interactivity to high
interactivity. Based on game theory studies of deceptive defenses, each time an
attacker interacts with a defense is a chance for the defender to alter the next
move an attacker is going to make (Pawlick et al., 2019). For the purposes of this
research, a chance to alter an attacker’s move (even if it is their first move) will
be considered an influence chance. Between these two concepts of interaction
amounts and influence chances, we see how deceptions can attempt to influence
an attacker and how many times an attacker is being influenced.
In a low interaction honeypot technique, a decoy firewall (aka honeywall)
could be set up to alert if scanned in a certain way. If a port on the honeywall is
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scanned, then the DDT can alert the defender that there is interest in their
network. The extent of this technique is low interaction with one influence
chance. The influence chance is contained within how the defender set up the
honeywall and what was seen by the attacker based on their scans. It is the
opening move of a potentially short game. Alternatively, there is a high
interaction DDT through attacker engagement. Attacker engagement involves a
plethora of potential influence chances (Heckman et al., 2015). Engaging an
attacker begins with the same level of interaction as most other deception
techniques, but then gets carried to each move the attacker makes and the
defense continues to try and deceive to reduce damage and/or learn from the
attack.
By following the deception chain presented by MITRE, the interactions
and influence that deceptions place on an attacker is laid out through purpose,
collecting intelligence, designing a cover story, planning, preparation, execution,
monitoring, and reinforcing (Heckman et al., 2015). Since this deception chain is
used to determine the depth of the deception, it can also be used to align the
influence chance with the defensive deception. For example, following the
MITRE deception chain to create a deception based moving target defense, the
interaction level of the defense is crafted, and by proxy the influence chances are
created:
1. Purpose: A defender will be determining the goal of the deceptive defense
and defining the requirements for success (Heckman et al., 2015). The
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depth of the deception will be decided, so the amount of interaction will
also be decided. This is where the number of chances to influence can be
determined, and it will be solidified in the planning phase. A MTD purpose
stage may include forcing the attacker within the network to be distracted
with a confusing attack area to stall for them to be removed (Zhang et al.,
2021). A success level for this example may be set at removing the
attacker before they are able to execute a successful exploit.
2. Collecting Intelligence: This is referred to as the prediction stage, where
the defender will be putting together the known history of the expected
threats. This intelligence can come from the Structured Threat Information
eXpression (STIX) or elsewhere, but research can be done for the
expected threats. STIX is a partner developed language that aids in this
stage. To apply this to a MTD example, the potential threats can be
gathered to understand what will be affecting the attack landscape (STIX,
2021). This stage could be an indicator for potentially useful influences
depending on direct attacker engagement opportunities.
3. Designing the cover story: An effective deception alters an attacker’s
perspective (Almeshekah, 2022) and this phase focuses on what would
cause an attacker to fall for the deception. Hiding and showing certain
pieces of information to allow for an illusion is done here. In the Tularosa
study (Ferguson-Walter, 2022), it is shown that an attacker in a network
full of decoys that is aware of the decoys, is still slowed down or
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hampered by the deception of fake systems around them. The influence
type can be determined here, even if it is as simple as causing an attacker
to believe there is deception at play. An attacker will be pressured, or
influenced, by a deception based on what they do and do not know about
it (Ferguson-Walter, 2022).
4. Plan: The technicalities of the deception are determined in this stage. For
this moving target defense example, a defender opted to utilize a form of
MTD with dynamic systems. These dynamic systems can cause attackers
to not know what type of target they will be applying exploits to (Zhang et
al., 2021). This potential confusion is an influence chance introduced by
the defender and can be adjusted with the style of systems chosen, the
vulnerabilities left open, or the rotation speed of the systems changing
their information.
5. Preparation: The effect of the deception is explored within this stage. The
actuality of the influence chance would be another way to phrase this. The
direction that an influence chance takes is going to be focused on by the
defense. This supports the cover story, and the resources at hand are
considered for creating the deceptive defense (Schuh, 2021).
6. Execution: Execution of the plan, the deceptive cover story, and the
preparation is coordinated between the deception planners and the
security operations.
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7. Monitoring: At this point, the planners and operators are observing the
culmination of their efforts. In this MTD example, there is no direct attacker
engagement, human to human, so the success is based on the deceptions
already laid out. There will be alarms alerting as to when the dynamic
system was attempted to be breached and where the attacker pivoted
next. When an alarm is sounded, the deception traps are triggered, along
with a classic measure of alerting the defenders. Findings from Cohen et
al. (2009) suggest that a human added on top of the deceptive traps adds
to the layers of defense, allowed for by the deceptive trap triggering the
alarm. This same researcher found that deception allows a defender more
options for their reactions as the attackers are slowed or less effective.
The success of the influence may be judged at this point through logs or
from the perspective of a live defender.
8. Reinforcing: This process is iterative and based on the results of the
monitoring, and the defense will be cycled through, adjusting to meet the
goals. Alternative influences could be attempted and judged, building
towards success if not currently successful.
After looking at these eight stages, influence chance is considered in the purpose
and determined in the design of the cover story. It is then planned for in the
preparation, applied in the execution, judged in the monitoring, and improved in
the reinforcement stage.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
SOCIAL ENGINEERING INFLUENCES

Social engineering is based on the idea that humans can be exploited into
doing the bidding of the social engineer (Mitnick, 2022). These exploited
characteristics take advantage of an existing vulnerability (Pawlick et al., 2019).
These exploits are not necessarily taking advantage of software vulnerabilities,
but instead are built from influencing human behavior (Mitnick, 2022). Influences
can be categorized into six principles of persuasion, which are defined and
assembled by Cialdini (2007): Reciprocation, Commitment and Consistency,
Social Proof, Liking, Authority, and Scarcity.

Cialdini’s Social Influence Principles
1. Reciprocation: The basic idea of reciprocity plays on the feeling of
obligation people feel when an exchange is made. People are going to
be more apt to return a favor if a perceived favor was done for them.
a. Social engineering example: In 2021, the FTC (Federal Trade
Commission) issued a warning regarding a tech support fraud
utilizing reciprocity. Attackers manipulated targets into believing
they did them the service of “removing” a virus or fixing a
different non-existent technical problem. The attackers then
charged a fee for their fraudulent services (Hebert et al., 2021).
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b. Deceptive defense use: Understanding reciprocation is vital for
a defense to understand that an attacker feels no desire to
return a favor to a defense. Attackers have a target and
timeframe to plan for reaching their goal, and if a defense
mechanism helps the attacker to achieve the goal, then the
attacker will still feel no reciprocity to the defense (Schuh,
2021).
2. Commitment and Consistency: This principle describes when people
are committed to perform the task. In this case, the peoples’ social
norms align with them doing what they said they are going to do.
a. Social engineering example: An organization that relies on email
correspondence could fall into a situation where an employee is
exploited by commitment and consistency. This scenario could
be seen from an accountant that pays their vendor through an
account number and has constant contact with the vendor.
Typically, she sends money to a vendor monthly, and an
attacker could insert themselves into the middle of the email
chain with the accountant. They would then ask for the payment
to a new account and the accountant could fall back on
consistency and commitment to pay the attacker. It may not be
discovered for weeks or until the vendor requests payment
again (Anonymous, n.d.).
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b. Deceptive defense use: Attackers will have different levels of
commitment to their attack. For the defense to understand how
to use the concept of commitment and consistency against an
attacker, the level and type of commitment may need to be
determined. This determination could be discovered at the
beginning stages of an attack. Sensors will be employed by the
defenders, and based on the initially sensed attack, a blocking
attempt could be aimed at the attacker. If partially blocked, and
then circumnavigated, the defense will know the attacker is
committed to the attack enough to continue even after
encountering a hurdle. In research presented by Horak et al.
(2017), it is discovered that an attacker is easier to deceive if
they have already devoted resources and effort towards an
attack. These researchers term this phenomenon “demise of the
greedy” but it falls into the influence category of commitment
and consistency. Based on the same research, this is an
influence concept that defensive deception designers will be
able to use to influence the direction of an attacker.
3. Social Proof: Social proofing works on the assumption people make
that if others are doing it, the action is more correct. This assumption
leads to an influence on perception based on other people performing
the same action the person is about to do.
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a. Social engineering example: Social proofing is the least used
principle in phishing emails (Ferreira, 2015). While less used in
phishing emails, it is used in fraud advertisements. In 2020,
Facebook added a warning to their FAQ section of their website
that included information on ways to avoid ads that claim a user
is among many other winners of a contest (Facebook, 2020).
This type of ad is pulling at an individual’s perception that if
other people won, it might be valid that they won too.
b. Deceptive defense use: A successful honey X technology can
be bolstered with the concept of social proofing. If an attacker
observed a honey-based deception that appeared to be used by
the users within an enterprise, it could lull them into a false
sense of security. Creating a honeynet that is closer to a
realistic network involves emulating traffic moving across the
network stack (Zhang et al., 2021). This action is playing on the
attacker’s desire to see others moving in a network, to try and
deceive an attacker into believing it is a true network, and not a
decoy network.
4. Liking: The “liking bond” is created by pulling at a victim’s desire to say
yes to someone or something that they know and or like. The desire to
know or like someone could be based off attractiveness, similarity,
compliments, or amount of contact.
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a. Social engineering example: The “liking” principle is the most
common principle of social engineering through phishing emails.
A phishing email is a way for a social engineer to reach out their
influence on a user to gain information or access through
deception and persuasion (Ferreira, 2015). A phishing email
that relies on the liking principle builds on social relationships
with the victim. For example, when an attacker gets access to a
user’s contact list, they would be able to spoof themselves as
one of the user’s friends. This builds on the social relationship
and the fact that a user is more likely to trust someone they
already know and like to further exploit the user.
b. Deceptive defense use: The liking principle can be seen in the
Tularosa Study conducted by Ferguson-Walter et al. (2018). It
was indirectly applied to a decoy system by crafting targets that
were appealing to an attacker. This attractive target was made
appealing by utilizing exploits that would be seen as common or
easy. These decoys looked more vulnerable and hence drew
the attacker to attempt to breach the given targets. Eighty-three
percent of the exploits launched in the study were towards the
decoys, proving the value of the liking principle in a deceptive
defense. Although it was not stated by the researchers that a
principle of influence was used, this building of a more attractive
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target can be seen as an influence principle and has potential to
be carried through to other deceptive defenses.
5. Authority: A person can become conditioned over their lifetime to
respond in a certain way to an authoritative figure. The response
becomes conditioned, and this conditioning is preyed on by social
engineers.
a. Social engineering example: Pulled from Cialdini’s set of
experiments, an experiment was performed where a false
physician called nurses to attempt to get them to give an
incorrect dose of medication. Ninety-five percent of nurses fell
for the use of authority over the phone call with the false
physician (Cialdini, 2007). The nursing role is trained to rely on
the expertise and experience of a doctor, and this leads to an
environment where the user is primed to fall victim to the
authority principle.
b. Deceptive defense use: The authority principle can be crafted
for a deceptive defense in specific scenarios. These specific
scenarios come from creating the conditions that an attacker
believe an authority of the organization’s security is alerted to
their attack. For example, after an attacker compromises a
system, a message may be set to trigger that the security team
has been alerted (Zhu et al. 2021). This type of influence would
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need to predict the attacker’s next move based on prior moves,
but the goal could be to cause the attacker to abandon their
attack.
6. Scarcity: A situation with scarcity implies that there is a perception of
missing resources. This influence principle plays on a person’s desire
to have something because of the perceived lack of resources.
a. Social engineering example: A social engineer creates urgency
through scarcity. Moving the decision process up for a victim
lends to the victim making a decision that benefits the social
engineer. In another example from Facebook, a popular
phishing message went around in 2011 utilizing the scarcity
principle (Cluley, 2012). This message told users that Facebook
was closing that day and they only had 15 minutes to retain their
account by logging in. The link in the message was malicious
and stole account information after the user tried to log in.
b. Deceptive defense use: For the defense to apply the scarcity
principle to their benefit, there must be a resource the attacker
needs from the defense. For example, this resource could be
the amount of time perceived available to the attacker for the
attack. Assuming the defense is using sensors to detect when
the attacker begins their attack, the resource “time” could be
controlled by the defense. This control exerted by the defense
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could be through a stated upcoming maintenance. Allowing the
attacker to know how long their attack is going to be, and
shortening it, creates scarcity of the resource “time”.

Social Engineering Attack Framework
A social engineering attack can be displayed through an attack framework.
This social engineering attack framework allows us to understand and investigate
an attack of influence from beginning to end (Mouton et al., 2014). It takes the
“art” of manipulating a person and breaks it down into a usable methodology that
we will be looking at as an opportunity to bolster a deceptive defense. Each of
the above principles of influence can be applied as the source of manipulation
within this framework. According to Mouton et al. (2014), a social engineering
attack is made from the types of communication, the social engineer, the goal,
the medium, the compliance principles, and the techniques. A framework put
together by the research of Mouton, based on Mitnick’s social attack model, will
give us the depth required to apply social engineering concepts. The Mouton et
al. (2014) framework is laid out in six steps:
1. Attack Formulation: The attack formulation stage is meant to determine
the goal and identify the target. This stage of the framework breaks the
target into either individuals or groups. Determining what is desired and
who it is desired from will guide future decisions.
2. Information Gathering: At this point a social engineer will gather as much
information as possible related to the target and the attack. According to
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Muscanell (2014), social engineers gain access to personal information
with the intent to strengthen a principle of social influence.
a. An attacker wants to find where they will find the information that
can further the attack.
i. Public information (websites, social media, and blogs) vs.
Private information (medical records, and bank accounts)
1. After gathering the information, the information is
assessed to determine what is relevant and what is
non-relevant.
b. This stage is repeated until the attacker is satisfied that enough
information has been gathered.
3. Preparation: The seasoned social engineer ensures everything is ready at
this point.
a. The information will be constructed into the bigger picture. This lays
out the pretext, forming the attack vector, which formulates a plan
to reach the goal.
4. Develop a Relationship: Develop a (good for the exploitation) relationship
with the target.
a. Developing a relationship is done through establishing
communication.
i. Example: An attacker could establish communication
through digital means such as an email.
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b. Within the development of a relationship is the building of a rapport.
This means that the form of communication must keep the victim
within the bounds of the ruse. The prior mentioned email must be
believable and not set off red flags within the victim’s head.
5. Exploit the relationship:
a. The target should be primed utilizing manipulation tactics with the
means of pointing the victim to the desired emotional state suited
for the plan.
b. After the target has reached the desired priming, the elicitation can
commence. Elicitation is the finale, where the attacker achieves
their end, such as a user clicking on the malicious link in the email
and the backdoor getting installed on their computer.
6. Debrief: In most cases, an attacker does not want to be caught, and it is in
their best interest to ensure the target is able to be attacked again if more
information is required.
a. To that end, the victim should be returned to a normal state of
mind.
b. At this point, if the first goal was achieved and there are further
goals, then it cycles back to the gathering information stage.
Analysis of How Influence Translates Defensively
The principles of influence laid out by Cialdini (2007) rely on the target to
be in a state of emotions that allow for the influence to be successful. Each
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technique has a different set of requirements to be successful. For example, in
Cialdini’s studies the scarcity principle is more effective when the target believes
there is competition for the scarce resource. In the case of attack vs. defense, a
social engineer may introduce scarcity and then enforce it with competition. For
example, in communication with a victim, a socially engineered attack may use
an advertisement that states there are only two items available in stock and that
the order needs to be placed immediately. This would be a ruse enforcing the
scarcity principle, and there would in fact be plenty left in stock for the victim to
buy (or none). They can then introduce competition for the resource with further
communication. If the victim reaches out to the attacker, they may then state that
the price has gone up because there is an imaginary bid on the last item. This
scenario illustrates the freedom a socially engineered attack has. While the social
engineer has this freedom, the deceptive defense may be extremely limited with
how they could introduce scarcity. The limitation stems from how they can
present deception to the attacker during an attack. In many examples, influence
exerted by a social engineer towards a victim might not be directly translated to a
defender using the same principle of persuasion on an attacker. An attacker will
have various aspects of their mindset, emotions, characteristics, personalities,
cultures, and knowledge base that alters the influence types used against them.
Zhang et al. (2021) propose that “biases are a cornerstone component to the
success of any deception-based mechanisms”. This same researcher states that
a major success factor is evaluating the progress of an attacker and how
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successful the deception was from the progress. As mentioned, the most popular
principle of influence used in phishing emails was the “liking” principle. To
implement this principle, an attacker will research their victim, or use common
aspects of liking, to be successful in their attack. A victim will be primed for an
attack because of the niceties in the email, the friendly greeting, the content that
speaks of an acquaintance, or the back and forth with a friendly individual. After
being primed for the attack and being in the correct emotional state, the social
engineer swoops in with a malicious request. To attempt to apply the concept of
liking against an attacker in the exact same way from the perspective of a
deceptive defense may be difficult, but to take the idea of how a social engineer
treats their victim to apply the concept of liking may have more success. The
defense has little control over their attacker’s emotional state in the early stages
of the defense, but if the concept of liking were applied during a MTD while the
attacker was confused or frustrated, it may be the way to manipulate their
behavior towards a target of your choosing (Pawlick et al., 2019). Understanding
when an attacker is confused, applying pressure at the right time, and then giving
them an out that commonly works for them during other attacks could give the
defense a successful tactic. The defense may not be able to prime the target
over the course of hours or days to the correct emotional state, but they will be
able to tell when an attacker is mid attack and running across issues due to a
deception chain based MTD.
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This chapter addresses “How can cyber defensive deception borrow
concepts from social engineering to aid in bolstering a deception-based
defense?” In the discussion of how a deception-based defense could borrow
concepts from social engineering, the prior chapter covered how a social
engineering attack is successful along with examples of attacks that utilize
successful concepts of social engineering. This success comes from the
influence and persuasion they apply to their victims and the framework used to
deliver their attacks to the victim. While looking at these successful attacks, we
looked at lessons and concepts a deceptive defense may learn from, and they
can use within specific defensive cases. We will continue looking at more finegrained concepts to be borrowed from social engineering in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION TO MATCH INFLUENCE CONCEPTS

Social engineering attacks and deceptive defense techniques both
influence human behavior to reach their goals. While one is an attack and one is
a defense, the principles of influence can be seen in both. This section is meant
to explore opportunities of influence a deceptive defense can utilize from the
success of social engineers. This exploration will be looking at similarities
between deceptive defenses and social engineering, the differences in influences
to exert, how the frameworks can be used together, and what is successful in
social engineering attacks that may be successful in matching deceptive defense
techniques.

Analysis Methodology
We have already determined that both offensive and defensive deception
can implement an influence chance, but there are fundamental differences
between how a social engineer can use influence and how a deceptive defense
can use influence. To work through these differences and applications, we will
look at each stage of the deception chain and each stage of the social
engineering framework paired with how principles of influence can be integrated
within the mesh of these techniques. To propose this meshed framework, we will
be selecting most similar deceptive defense techniques to set against most
similar social engineering techniques. After selecting these most similar
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techniques, we will select the principles of influence being used within each
technique. Next, we will treat the planning of the deceptive technique as if it were
a social engineering attack and see how the planning would happen within those
contexts set directly against the most similar social engineering attack.

Picking Techniques to Apply Influence
To select a similar social engineer attack technique to pair with a
defensive deception, we will start by first classifying the form of communication
that they use. To do this, we look to the research done by Mouton et al. (2014)
who breaks social engineering tactics into two main classes: direct and indirect
communication. If we bring this form of classification to deceptive defense
techniques, honey technology would be indirect communication, where there is
an intermediary of communication through the defense. The closer we get to the
attacker’s engagement technique, the closer we get to what could be classified
as direct communication. Next, we will pick a pairing of attack and defense that
utilize a similar medium. The medium can be seen as how the interaction of
communication is performed. A honey technique could use a network of decoys
(honeynet) to communicate their deception to an attacker, and this medium
would be communicated to an attacker’s scanning capabilities. Finally, the
selection will also delve into the concepts of influence assembled by Cialdini
(2007). Both social engineering and deceptive defense work within the bounds of
what can feasibly influence a target in the chosen technique. Even if there is a
similar communication style and a similar medium, there may not be a similar
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influence. For example, an attacker can utilize the authority principle in a
phishing email, but authority may end up being ineffective by a defense utilizing a
moving target defense which matches the communication type of a phishing
email. In addition to the influence type similarity, we will be selecting a technique
that extends, or through its goal opts to extend a similar amount of influence
chances. To visualize the qualitative process of identifying a similar technique
from both categories, the following two tables were assembled.

Table 2. Defensive Deception Qualitative Analysis
Category

Honeypot Honeynet Honeytoken MTD

Attacker
Engagement

Communication I
Type

I

I

I, D

D

Medium

DC

DC

DC, PC

DC

DC, PC

Influence
Chances

L-M

M-H

M-H

H

H

The “Communication Type” category is labeled as I for indirect
communication and D for direct communication. The “Medium” category is
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labeled as DC for digital contact and PC for physical contact. The “Medium”
category will be judged and broken down further, after the initial selection of the
most similar technique. The “Influence Chance” category is labeled as L for low,
M for medium, and H for high. Low to high ratings are based on the amount of
interaction the technique is likely to extend to the target.

Table 3. Social Engineering Qualitative Analysis
Whaling Tailgating

Reverse
Engineer

Baiting Pretext

Communication I, D
Type

D

I, D

D

I

D

Medium

DC, PC

DC,
PC

PC

DC, PC

DC,
PC

DC,
PC

Influence
Chances

M-H

M-H

H

M-H

M-H

H

Category

Phishing

Based on the initial qualitative analysis tables, the most aligned
techniques are “Honeytoken” and “Baiting”. Both honeytoken and baiting use
indirect communication (Mouton et al., 2014), digital or physical contact types,
and have a medium to high influence chance amount (Aldawood et al., 2020).

44

These can be judged as similar, and examples show the logical similarity of
each. A honeytoken is laid down by the defense to draw an attacker to it, to
further the goal of the defense. The attacker then uses the honeytoken, either
being misdirected to a trap or to give away what their attack is going to be. A
baiting set by a social engineer can be seen as performing a similar task, with a
different end goal. The baiting is laid down to draw a victim in, furthering the
attacker’s goals. It could be in the form of a poisoned USB drive, where the
attacker wants the victim to use it to gather more information from the victim or
direct the victim to another influence chance, such as a malicious website. Now
that a similarity has been established, the next stage is determining the types of
influence a social engineer uses with the baiting technique and the types of
influence a defender may use.

Influence Stacking
For a defense to choose a type of influence used within a honeytoken
deception technique, we can look at the success social engineers have had with
the poisoned USB drive. What makes the poisoned USB drive a viable tactic
used by social engineers? According to Ferreira et al. (2015), social engineers
utilize multiple concepts of influence together. This researcher studied phishing
emails, but the results of stacking influences can be extrapolated to the baiting
technique. Example: An attacker embeds a keylogger in a file on a USB drive
and presents it to a target at a music festival. They do not just hand it to the
victim and expect the victim to use it. They may present it saying something like:
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“I am a singer and here is my latest song, only a few people have gotten to listen
to it. Could you please let me know what you think? I feel like you have good
taste in music since you’re here too.” This example is made up but demonstrates
the stack of influence concepts in three sentences. Scarcity from the few people
that have listened to the song, reciprocity from the act of picking the audience to
give a gift of a song to and liking from the compliment in music are all at play in
one influence chance.
So, what can the deception-based defense learn from this example of
social engineering and baiting? The social engineer picked a song to give away
at the music festival, matching the context of the environment. If the honeytoken
were built for a hospital, the token could be a false patient file or a duplicate
doctor’s credentials. The social engineer used a liking principle in their influence
chance. A defender could utilize an influence concept such as liking to make the
honey token appealing to the attacker, such as a false file labeled “classified”. On
top of pushing and pulling with influence concepts, the honeytoken itself could
lead to further deceptions and influence chances, just like the USB drive leading
to a malicious keylogger.

Using the Framework in the Chain
Planning the deception chain and outlining the social engineering
framework were both presented in prior sections. Similar techniques have been
identified and influences have been considered, next we can see how social
engineer attacks may add concepts to the deception chain for the defense. This

46

section cross references the frameworks presented in the prior sections with the
intent of finding an application of the social attack framework within the MITRE
deception chain. As seen below, the deception chain can incorporate the idea of
a social engineering attack if the defense chooses to focus on influencing the
attacker and account for their reactions or emotional state.
1. Purpose: When a defender is planning their deceptive defense, the
social attack framework can begin to be considered to find the purpose
of the deception. Determining the attacker’s goal will aid in deciding the
purpose of the defense. A social engineering attack begins by defining
the goal and the purpose of the defense aids in thwarting the goal.
2. Collecting Intelligence: Normally, a deceptive based defense puts
together known attacks in this stage. In addition to this, they can add to
this stage by profiling the attacker who composes the most current
threats. This profiling matches the SE attack framework stage where
an attacker gathers as much information related to the victim as
possible. Public, private, and alternative methods of gathering
information on attacker types can be utilized. This stage may include
adding the first deceptive defense, a honey device that can detect if it
is a human based attack or an AI based attack (Horak et al., 2017).
3. Designing the Cover Story: The deception chain speaks of influence at
this point but based on the prior stage incorporating the SE attack
framework, the profile of an attacker and the purpose of their attack
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can be included in the choice of influence. A plan to return the attacker
back to an emotionally ready-to-be deceived state may also be added
within this stage as it will continue the ability for defenders to utilize
influence chances.
4. Plan: Since this is where the technicality of the deception is formed, it
should also be where the defense can decide on how they can do the
equivalent of developing a relationship with the attacker. This
“relationship” may be in the form of how the attacker interacts with the
deception and what they expect the attacker to do based on the
interaction.
5. Preparation: Like the prior stage, based on the attacker profile, the
attacker goal, and the deception of choice, preparation can focus on
the guidance of the attacker through the deception. This matches the
SE attack stage of “preparation” where the engineer is trying to
account for building the big picture of how an attack will happen.
6. Execution: The execution stage aligns with the SE framework stage of
exploitation. The deception chain can borrow the idea of priming within
this stage. Priming the attacker for a deceptive defense can come from
the order of events, the deception in use, or the timing of the defense
(Zhu et al., 2021).
7. Monitoring: A social engineer can monitor their attack, to determine
how the victim is responding, to then adjust as needed. A deceptive
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defense normally monitors for the culmination of their efforts as well.
To borrow from a social engineer, a plan can incorporate multiple side
shoots to account for how the attacker “may” react with guidance
triggers to manipulate the attacker back on course to the goal of the
defense (Zhu et al., 2021).
8. Reinforcing: Depending on the goal of the defense, it may be
determined that the tracks of the deception should be covered. This is
a play out of a social engineer’s playbook when they do not want to be
caught. A deceptive defense covering their tracks similarly to a social
engineer may resolve retribution or hide how the defense was
successful to the attacker.
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CHAPTER SIX:
CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This project researched the similarities between a deceptive defense and
a socially engineered attack. This similarity is highlighted with the principles of
influence and the manipulation of human behavior. By understanding how they
work separately, we can see how these techniques are related and how the
defense is supported by concepts borrowed from the social engineering
framework. Not only can they incorporate some of the framework, but they can
look to the success of socially engineered attacks for inspiration in the defense.
Lastly, a defense can work to build up their influence chances to aid in applying
influences on an attacker.
Defenders face hurdles of applying influence in the way that social
engineers apply influence on their victims. There are specific techniques within
both the offensive deception and the defensive deception that have striking
similarities. These similar techniques are useful to identify and understand for
alignment techniques social engineers use with techniques deceptive defenders
use. Aligning similar techniques allows for less hurdles of influence uses and
allows for inspiration to be extracted from a successful social engineering attack.
Further research into how an attacker reacts to specific influence
principles during an attack would be useful in the field of understanding influence
on an attacker. A study that attempts to influence a multitude of attackers with
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the same defensive item, such as a moving target defense, and uses multiple
influence concepts to enforce the deception would be desirable. A study like this
would allow for documenting the most useful influence concept in different
situations during a deceptive defense. Finally, it may also be useful to explore
how a honeypot could be strategically used as an initiator of an offensive
deception attack for an aberrant guest.
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